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Recent Developments

Philip Morris, Inc. v. Glendening

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that the
Attorney General, upon obtaining
the approval of the Board of Public
Works, has the power to enter into
contingency fee contracts with
private law firms to secure
representation for the State of
Maryland. Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Glendening, 349 Md. 660, 709
A.2d 1230 (1998). The Attorney
General may deduct a percentage
of the money recovered by the
state in litigation, and use that
percentage as a contingency fee
payment to a private law firm,
without offending Maryland
statutory law or constitutional
principles concerning legislative
appropriation. The court also
ruled that contingency fee
contracts in which private law
firms have a financial interest in
the outcome of state litigation do
not violate due process or public
policy. In so deciding, the court
extended to the Attorney General
the ability to secure contingency
fee based representation for
tobacco litigation.
The Attorney General of
Maryland
entered
into
a
contingency
fee
contract
("contract") with a private law
firm ("outside counsel") to secure
representation for the State of
Maryland in tort litigation against
tobacco manufacturers.
The
purpose of the litigation was to
seek reimbursement for the State
Treasury for past tobacco-related
expenditures. Due to the large
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amount of state financial resources
and personnel that would be
necessary for successful litigation,
coupled with the wealthy and
powerful nature of tobacco
companies, the Attorney General
determined that this was an
extraordinary situation and that
outside counsel was necessary for
successful litigation. The resulting
contract with outside counsel
provided for a twenty-five percent
contingency fee to be paid to
outside counsel from any money
recovered by the state.
The
Attorney General sought and
obtained the express written
approval of the State Board of
Public Works for the contingency
fee contract.
Philip Morris, Inc., ("Philip
Morris") one of the defendants,
challenged the contract in the
Circuit Court for Talbot County
contending that the Attorney
General lacked the authority to
enter into the contract with outside

counsel. Both Philip Morris and
the Attorney General moved for
summary judgment. The trial
court denied Philip Morris' motion
and ruled in favor of the Attorney
General. Philip Morris appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, but before the court
could consider the case, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland issued a
writ of certiorari sua sponte.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by examining the powers
granted to the Attorney General by
the Maryland Constitution and the
enactments of the General
Assembly of Maryland. Philip
Morris, 349 Md. at 674-75, 709
A.2d at 1237 (citing State v.
Burning Tree Club, 301 Md. 9,32,
481 A.2d 785, 797 (1984)).
Among these powers, the court
stated that, "the Attorney General,
with the written approval of the
Governor, may employ any
assistant counsel that the Attorney
General considers necessary to
carry out any duty of the office in
an extraordinary or unforeseen
case." Id. at 675, 709 A.2d at
1237. (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE GOV'T § 6-105 (1997)).
The court noted that the Attorney
General and the Governor had
determined that the tobacco
litigation fell within the meaning
of an "extraordinary" case, based
on the nature of the litigation. Id.
at 676, 709 A.2d at 1238. The
court concluded that because
Maryland law gives the Attorney
General discretion to determine
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 67
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whether a case is extraordinary
under section 6-1 05(b), the court
must accept the
Attorney
General's determination of the
need for outside counsel. Id. at
678, 709 A.2d at 1239. (citing
United States v. George S. Bush &
Co., 310 U.S. 371 (1940)). The
court cautioned, however, that it is
not clear whether state funds
. recovered from litigation could
compensate
outside
counsel
pursuant to a contingency fee
contract. Id. at 679, 709 A.2d at
1239. Although the court found
no statutory prohibition in section
6-1 05(b) on the ability of the
Attorney General to enter into such
a contract, the
issue of
constitutionality
was
more
complicated. Id. at 680-81, 709
A.2d at 1240. The focus was
therefore shifted to whether the
contingency fee arrangement
violated the Maryland Constitution
prohibition against the payment of
state funds without legislative
appropriation. Id. at 681, 709
A.2d at 1240. (citing MD. CONST.
art. III, § 32). Pursuant to section
6-213 of the State Finance and
Procurement Article of the
Annotated Code of Maryland, the
Attorney General is required to
deposit recovery money into the
state treasury within one month of
its receipt. Id. After deposit, the
state money may not be withdrawn
to pay a contingency fee unless
there is a legislative appropriation
authorizing the withdrawal. Id.
(quoting Dorsey v. Petrott, 178
Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940)).
There were no provisions made by
the state for the appropriation of
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 68

the contingency fee because the
contract allocated the contingency
fee out of the gross settlement,
before any money was deposited
into the State Treasury. Id. at 66667, 709 A.2d at 1233. The issue
then became when the recovery
becomes
state
funds;
at
disbursement or upon deposit into
the state treasury. Id. at 682, 709
A.2d at 1241.
The court resolved the
appropnatIon
issue
by
distinguishing between money
already deposited into the state
treasury and a gross settlement that
has yet to be deposited.
Id.
According to the court, Article III
section 32 of the Maryland
Constitution does not apply to the
gross settlement recovered from
litigation. Id. Therefore, money
may be taken from the gross
settlement before it must be
deposited into the State Treasury.
Id. The court reasoned that since
the contract specifically provided
that the state would not collect any
money from the lawsuit until
outside counsel had received their
contingency fee, the contingency
fee money did not constitute state
funds subject to legislative
appropriation until the state had
fulfilled its obligations under the
contract. Id. The court reserved
the determination of whether the
Attorney General has the power
under section 6-1 05(b) to enter
into a contingency fee contract
without the approval of the State
Board of Public Works. Id. at 681,
709 A.2d at 1240. It was not at
issue in this case since the
Attorney General had the express

consent of the Board of Public
Works.ld.
The court then moved on to
discuss the secondary issues of due
process and public policy and how
they affect the ability of outside
counsel to work on behalf of the
state in a case in which they have a
financial stake. Id. at 684, 709
A.2d at 1242.
The court
determined that due process does
not necessarily preclude an
attorney from representing the
state in cases in which they have a
financial stake. Id. at 687-88, 709
A.2d at 1243. (citing Marshall v.
Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980)
(finding that State administrators
do not need to be completely
detached and neutral in an
adversarial system.)) The court
thus determined that outside
counsel's financial interest in the
tobacco litigation was within
reasonable limits, given the
holding of the Supreme Court in
Marshall. Id. at 688, 709 A.2d at
1244.
The court's holding in the
instant case permIttmg the
Attorney General to enter into
contingency fee contracts with
private law firms is consistent with
Maryland law, public policy, and
due process. Given the nature of
current tobacco litigation, the
court's ruling is beneficial to the
State of Maryland because it will
ensure that the litigation receives
the attention it deserves. This
case, however, constitutes a large
setback to the tobacco companies
involved in both current and future
litigation. Had the court ruled that
the State's contingency fee
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contract was unauthorized, a
tobacco company's extensive
financial resources would have
given it a distinct advantage over
the low funding and high workload
of the Attorney General's office.

29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 69

